Federalism and Subnational Connection: Seniority and Incentives in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (1983-2025)

Abstract

Legislative scholarship views parliamentary experience (seniority) as a key asset for congressional institutionalization, a view shaped by the U.S. case. However, Argentina’s Chamber of Deputies has a low reelection rate. In this article, I analyze the conditions under which experience is subordinated to other incentives and discuss its possible consequences. I argue that political careers privilege subnational territorial power and that access to candidacies depends on governors, presidents, and party or territorial leaders who do not necessarily reward legislative specialization. The analysis draws on an original dataset that I compiled from official Chamber rosters. Between 1985 and 2021, immediate reelection accounted for 22.5 percent of new terms, while the proportion involving prior experience reached 30.2 percent once returns after an interruption are included. This finding confirms high turnover but shows that immediate reelection underestimates prior experience among those beginning a term.