Decisionism and Decision. Carl Schmitt and a Return to the Simplicity of the Beginning

Abstract

The theoretical reflection upon Argentine democracy has profited from Carl Schmitt’s concept of decisionism, which appeared to be a useful means of referring to recent political history. This wide use of the term has nonetheless coexisted with a persisting lack of accuracy and purport. This article deals with the concept of decisionism, in order to gain conceptual accuracy, by means of the restitution of the specific sense of the judicial decision. To this effect this article comments on Carl Schmitt’s treatment of judicial adjudications, as presented in Gesetz und Urteil (1912).  Three essential features of all decision are therewith drawn: its autonomy in relation to the norm, its normalizing orientation, and its personal nature. Once described these features of the normal decision, this article focuses on Politische Theologie (1922) in order to reflect upon the specificity of the exceptional decision. Finally a definition of Schmittian decisionism is proposed, and a series of conclusions concerning political theory and practice are drawn.